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Feminists can invoke numerous criteria to decide whether a scholarly work is
feminist speech or whether it marginalizes or neutralizes gender. Does it value
women’s voices and enable their expression in diversity? Does it give due and
generous attention to feminist speakers, including theorists and marginalized
subjects? Does it enable a critical rejection of masculinist theory and prac-
tice, and of other forms of oppression? Does it fit the abstract perspective of
the theorist to the activist perspective of the feminist political agent working
for change? On these criteria, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (London:
Routledge 1993) seems to have a claim to count as feminist as well as ecofeminist
speech: the standpoint of women’s oppression supplies most the book’s theo-
ry, experiential basis and examples, and feminist philosophy forms its primary
theoretical base. I aim to bring ecofeminism closer to contemporary feminism,
freeing it from assumptions incompatible with feminisms of class and colour in
order to clear the way for a more integrated oppression perspective.
Janis Birkeland (”Disengendering Ecofeminism” The Trumpeter 12:4 Fall 1995,
178-180) consults none of these normal criteria to support her contention that
Feminism and the Mastery of Nature marginalizes gender. Janis Birkeland’s
claim that it presents a ”gender blind analysis” is based on several major mis-
conceptions about the concept of mastery and the place of gender in the web
of oppression. The first of these misconceptions identifies mastery with the
master/slave relationship, disregarding and distorting crucial sections of my
text. The second misconception is that a properly gender-conscious ecofemi-
nism implies ranking gender over all other forms of oppression as more basic
and structurally crucial. The third, unstated assumption which is presupposed
throughout Birkeland’s argument is an overfamiliar scope confusion which leads
her to the false dichotomy that declining to prioritise gender implies marginaliz-
ing gender. Once these connected confusions are unravelled, the real substance
behind the accusation of ”disengendering ecofeminism” emerges as my rejection
of the doctrine that gender is the most fundamental form which always has pri-
ority over other forms of oppression. I would argue that this doctrine involves an
unnecessary and damaging assumption for ecofeminism, and marks Birkeland’s
version of ecofeminism as isolated from contemporary developments in feminist
and postcolonial theory.
The leading premise for Birkeland’s argument that ecofeminism is neutered is
that the term ”mastery” refers in my work to master-slave dualism, which she
claims is treated as the fundamental relationship of dominance (in place of the
gender duality Birkeland thinks ought to occupy this privileged place.) But
Birkeland’s claim that I substitute the master-slave dualism for dominance re-
lationship, as overarching concepts, involves careless reading and gross misrepre-
sentation. In Feminism and the Mastery of Nature I do discuss the master/slave
relationship, along with other dualities, in connection with Plato’s work, but
ascribe to it neither historical nor methodological priority. The concept of mas-
tery itself is definitionally tied, not to the master/slave relationship, but to the
concept of ”the master subject” in wide use among feminist and postcolonial
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theorists.1 Given the thesis my book defends, that the master subject’s main
project is the rational colonization of the lower order of nature represented as
a void inviting occupation, the concept of the master subject is equivalent to
the overarching (determinable) concept of the coloniser identity (as used for
example by Mies and Shiva 1993), in the case where multiple specific sites of
colonization are recognized. I explore the logic of this concept in Chapter Two
(The Logic of Colonisation), defining this subject role in a quite precise sense as
characterized by dualistic relations which produce a logical structure common
to several different forms of colonization or oppression.
Thus the concept of the master subject is a placeholder or variable which defines
a determinable subject place that can be occupied by a range of determinate
forms; the concept of mastery stands to androcentrism, eurocentrism/racism,
anthrocentrism etc., much as the concept of colour stands to red, blue, green,
etc.2 The master-slave relation is one, but only one, of the possible determinates
of mastery, and occupies no privileged place. The concept of the master subjec-
t also brings together several well-established contemporary senses of mastery
further to the master-slave sense Birkeland has seized upon. The first is that
of the ”master or head of the household” (OED)3, the occupant of the modern
Lockean edifice of property, who appropriates the labour of denied and subor-
dinated groups - women, servants, the colonized, the labouring and excluded
classes, and of nature itself. The second sense denotes the figure who holds the
cultural master key (OED), the (false) universal subject who claims to speak
for all and who can remain unmarked because he is normalized in the master
discourse (contrasting with subjugated knowledges and marginalized discours-
es) at the heart of hegemonic culture. The master subject of modernity is not
the patriarch but his son and heir, he whose liberating fraternal enterprise it is
to take for his brothers and himself the displaced father’s domain of power over
women and the lower order called ”nature.”4
Birkeland’s assertion that I identify the overarching dualism with the mas-
ter/slave relation runs totally counter to my text. I take reason, in its dominant
Western conception in rationalism, to be the chief characteristic associated with
the master subject of Western culture and with his project of colonization. But
it is a major and clearly stated thesis of my work that the overarching dualism
of Western culture opposes the sphere of reason (mind, spirit) to that of na-
ture as a sphere of multiple exclusions of reason encompassing women..., slaves,
indigenous peoples, nonwhite races, and animals, (and of course much more, in-
cluding non-human biological life, necessity, and the body.) Hence the relevant
dualistic contrast to mastery is not slavery, but nature as a determinable lower
sphere of exclusion and colonization. The master subject is unmarked One to
marked Other; not only master to the other’s slave, but also man/masculine to
the Other’s woman/feminine, civilized to the Other’s primitive, rational to the
Other’s irrational (emotion), objective to the Other’s subjective, mind to the
Other’s body, and so on. To prioritise the master-slave relationship characteris-
tic of antiquity as the fundamental model for domination would be limiting and
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anachronistic in the context of modernity. And since slavery is a premodern
form of the class relationship, this reading is inconsistent with my explicit and
prominent rejection of Marxist class reduction.
These misconceptions about mastery are supplemented by the false choice Birke-
land presents between prioritizing gender and neglecting it. I am accused of
failing ”to use gender as a metaphorical icon of value”, instead ”relegating the
concept to just another means by which people are categorized, much in the way
that race and class have been used to marginalise people.” The intense debates
in feminism in the last twenty years over the use of gender concepts as surrogates
for all other types of domination seem to have passed Birkeland by entirely. The
outcome of these debates has been a clear recognition by most feminists that
there are multiple dimensions of oppression, a rejection of assumptions of hier-
archy among them, and a rejection of the surrogacy and prioritization of gender
assumed by Birkeland. Birkeland assumes that there must be such a hierarchy,
that since I replace patriarchy by mastery I must have replaced the dominance
of gender dualism by the dominance of the master/slave dualism. But to re-
ject a hierarchy of oppressions is not to marginalize gender any more than it
is to marginalize class or race, . gender-conscious analysis is not the same as
a gender-prioritizing analysis. By the same logic, much contemporary feminist
theory itself would have to count as ”degendered” or as marginalizing gender,
a reductio ad absurdum of Birkeland’s argument. Birkeland misses entirely the
point that it is not a question of replacing one kind of hierarchy privileging
women’s oppression, by another which privileges slavery (or class or race) but
rather of abandoning the ranking compulsion along with the whole idea that we
can establish any general methodological priority among oppressions.
Although some older forms of ecofeminism may have embraced it, ecofeminis-
m does not require the doctrine of methodological priority for gender, or the
associated reduction of power to male power and its transformation to a mat-
ter of remaking male psychology.5 It can demonstrate powerful links between
feminism and ecology and between androcentrism and anthrocentrism without
the reductionist assumptions which appear persistently throughout Birkeland’s
article.6 The doctrine that gender is a unitary and more fundamental form of
oppression is a hindrance both to developing the cooperative forms of struggle
we need and to developing critical insight into feminism itself. Methodological
priority for gender assumes that women’s oppression must always be ranked as
more fundamental, strategically prior to other forms of oppression in all con-
texts. To reject this universalizing approach however is not to assume that forms
of oppression can never be ranked, or to suggest that we can never make distinc-
tions of relevance or explanatory priority. Gender is pre-eminent in structuring
certain contexts, particularly the private sphere of intimate and personal rela-
tions, as bell hooks notes.7 Rather to deny methodological priority to gender is
to avoid making any general theoretical ranking of oppressions, whose priority
can then be treated as contextually-variable rather than open to some sort of
universal and abstract determination.
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Of course it is in one sense ”our job” as feminists to stress the importance of
gender and gender analyses and make sure they are not overlooked, but that
does not imply constructing a hierarchy of oppressions with gender at the top, or
elevating the importance of gender by depreciating and trivializing the Other’s
form of oppression in a misguided competition for ”most basic” place. This as-
sumes a separation we cannot make, for on closer examination, the depreciated
form of oppression often turns out to be that of marginalized aspects of ourselves
or of our own group, and not quite so other as we thought. When contempt for
nature or animality turns out to entail contempt for what is represented as na-
ture or animality in our group, and for whatever is marginalized under this guise,
it is our problem, not the Other’s. So attention to Women’s oppression requires
attention to many other forms; there is no such thing as a pure ”women’s op-
pression.” Birkeland’s own work8 shows what happens when such a prioritizing
approach for gender in relation to other oppressions is assumed: constant, vague
and highly generalized claims are advanced, presupposing the historical and ex-
planatory priority of gender (”far deeper”, ”far harder to change”, ”the oldest
war”, ”more central”, ”at the core”, ”more crucial”, ”the key”, ”underlying”,
”pivotal”, ”the glue” etc.) Birkeland’s prioritization of gender is clearly accom-
panied by a depreciation of the importance of the Other’s oppression. Thus
anthrocentrism is said to be merely a ”cerebral concept”,9 and to be easy to
change, unlike androcentrism.10 It is puzzling that anyone could describe prac-
tices which daily destroy the non-human and human life of the Earth as only a
”cerebral concept”, but the intent here is clearly to suggest lower explanatory
and strategic priority.
Feminist arguments that some forms of the critique of anthrocentrism (deep
ecology) involve masculinist approaches and assumptions, have mainly been
based on bringing out neglected connections with gender, rather than on pri-
oritizing gender.11 Birkeland’s argument12 that androcentrism is more basic
than anthrocentrism and much harder to dislodge, and that deep ecology is
masculinist where it does not concede the priority of gender, stands in contrast.
The argument that anthrocentrism is less central and easy to change compared
to androcentrism neglects their close connection and parallel structure. An-
throcentrism is embedded just as strongly as androcentrism is in the Western
conceptual and perceptual framework and its most basic practices, and is the
last area to be subject to sustained critique. Insight into the colonizer role
always required the development of other-attentive and self-critical capacities,
but in the case of anthrocentrism this is required to an even greater degree than
usual because non-humans do not usually articulate or confront us with their
oppression directly, and we have to arrive at knowledge of our species coloniz-
er identity more indirectly. There is a problem not only about the point of
claiming that androcentrism is more conceptually and historically basic than
anthrocentrism, but about what this claim means and how it could be estab-
lished.13 One method might be to argue that justifications for non-gender forms
of oppression always refer back to women or the feminine as the source of infe-
riority, and that such references are not symmetrical, so that gender oppression
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is the common basic justificatory reference point. But such asymmetry does
not seem to hold, and in any case Birkeland herself destroys this possible source
of support by asserting that it is the association of various oppressed group,
including women, with nature (not with women or the feminine) which justifies
their exploitation.14
Birkeland offers no support for the gender priority doctrine, other than the
conviction that all ”social pathologies” are ultimately traceable to a monolithic
”Patriarchy,” and that a program of remaking ”the male psyche” and replacing
male values will undo all power and oppression.15 These assumptions give rise
to a cluster of further misconceptions about my work and analysis of power.
Birkeland takes it as an objection to my account that power does not begin in
ancient Greece, where my analysis starts, and that power is never defined. How-
ever, I certainly do not attempt to provide in my historical work any universal
account of the origins of power or domination, nor do I think this is possible
in a non-trivial way: what I aim to provide, as I clearly state, is an accoun-
t of the marriage of reason and domination, and of reason nature/dualism in
the historical context of the West and in the rationalist tradition of philosophy.
My leading project is to show how a particular kind of power, the dualistic
conceptual structures which naturalize certain oppressions, can be remade in
ways which denaturalize them. I would certainly reject the view that power
is inevitable or is ”just somehow pervading human relationships,” although in
contrast to Birkeland’s own view of power as a simple function of male domi-
nation, I would certainly want to understand power as more complex, multiple
and diffused through a variety of practices and conceptual networks.
Closely associated with the drive to prioritize gender is the drive to present
all oppressions as reducible to a single all-encompassing form, which Birkeland
labels ”Patriarchy.” The work of Black feminists and women of colour has been
at the centre of a major debate on gender and race in the last two decades of
feminist theory which has highlighted the severe problems in these assumption-
s. As Elizabeth Spelman has cogently argued, the doctrine that gender is more
fundamental articulates a privileged perspective, since those who are able to
focus exclusively on gender must be those whose experiences allow them to see
other forms of oppression as secondary or inconsequential, that is, women priv-
ileged by race and class.16 Such a position is unable to represent the experience
of marginalized women whose lives are strongly marked by class, race, ethnic or
other forms of oppression.17 It renders invisible the crucial areas of intersection
which, rather than the abstract concept of gender appealed to in Birkeland’s
account, operate together with the common logic of the master subject to hold
the interlocking structure of oppressions together.
Perhaps the worst feature of the doctrine of gender priority is the obstacle the
associated conception of Patriarchy as the regime of unitary male oppressors ver-
sus unitary female oppressed presents to the recognition of fractured identities
and to a self-critical feminist practice which confronts women’s participation in
Copyright 1999 Trumpeter
Does Ecofeminism Need the Master Subject? A Response to Janis Birkeland 7
oppressive structures.18 It is unable to come to grips with the colonizer within,
”that piece of the oppressor which is planted deep within each of us,” in Audre
Lord’s phrase. Along with many contemporary feminists, I reject the reduction-
ist concept of Patriarchy Birkeland advocates, not because it is too radical and
confronting, as Birkeland implies, but because it is not radical enough and does
not confront its own silencing or marginalized women who do not always suffer
primarily from or personally prioritize gender oppression.19 In contrast, the the-
ory of the master subject provides a way to drop rank reductionism privileging
a unitary oppression model and substitute a concept of multiple, intersecting
and interlocking oppressions and fractured identities.
Birkeland’s strategy of stretching the concept of patriarchy (or Patriarchy) to
act as a surrogate for all forms of dualism, power relations and oppression, while
retaining the usual connotation of patriarchy as gender oppression, smuggles in
via definition the assumption that gender oppression encompasses, explains or
reduces all other forms.20 Many feminists now opt for a more inclusive strategy
and terminology, in search of a non-reductive integration which does not mask
the multiplicity of oppressions. Birkeland’s comments are remarkably insensi-
tive to important differences here, for among those who adopt an alternative
inclusive approach which contrasts sharply with Birkeland’s reductionist stance
are the very theorists whose work she commends, Maria Mies and Vandana
Shiva in Ecofeminism. Thus Mies does not allow the concept of Patriarchy
to engulf all other forms of oppression in Birkeland’s fashion, but is careful
to speak of capitalist patriarchy, and to call for a theoretical integration of
thesecritiques.21 But the recognition of multiplicity Mies’ concept of capitalist
patriarchy provides, although necessarily better than Birkeland’s, is much too
limited: capitalist patriarchy is patently too thin to give an account of ”White
Man,” the master subject they associate with colonisation, so that this key con-
cept, which is used throughout Ecofeminism, appears in an unclearly theorised
way.22 Nor is it obvious how Mies’ capitalist patriarchy can give due weight to
the concept of anthrocentrism or naturism needed for a fully-fledged ecological
feminism, which makes only fleeting appearances in the book.
If we are exceptionally brave and don’t mind the looks on our listener’s faces, we
can of course try to speak of white supremacist, naturist, capitalist patriarchy.
But a simple enumeration of oppressions has more problems than just awkward-
ness: enumeration suggests an additive account23 rather than an interlocking
one in terms of mutual modification, and generates continuing problems about
completeness no matter how long we make the list because it selects not an
open but a closed set and provides no way to extend it. It is good methodolo-
gy to give preference to accounts which are open to including further forms of
oppression not yet recognized or articulated. A concept such as mastery which
defines a determinable subject place in terms of structural characteristics can
be useful here, making it possible to recognize both commonality and difference,
both the openness and multiplicity of determinate oppressions, and to validate
and integrate multiple critiques without hierarchy or reduction.
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Notes
1. To give just a few examples, the concept of the master subject is used
by Donna Haraway (”Situated Knowledges” in Simians, Cyborgs and Women
London: Free Association Books 1991), Nancy Hartsock (”Foucault on Power:
a Theory for Women” in Linda J. Nicholson ed. Feminism/Postmodernism New
York: Routledge 1990), William Connolly ”Voices from the Whirlwind” in Jane
Bennett and William Chaloupka eds. In the Nature of Things Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1993), and in several essays in Sidonie Smith
and Julia Watson eds. De/Colonising the Subject Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1992.)
2. Birkeland presents no case at all for her claim that the concept of the master
subject involves mind/body dualism.
3. OED: Oxford English Dictionary. Birkeland neglects a whole range of rele-
vant connotations of mastery, including the idea of mastery as the production of
a transparent and controllable world. See for example Valerie Walkerdine 1988
The Mastery of Reason London: Routledge.
4. This master subject is already himself a fractured identity combining op-
pressed and oppressor aspects, since his discourse of freedom and gesture of
emancipation from the power of the father is deeply ambiguous in its eman-
cipatory content. This fracture spills over into the ambiguity of the fraternal
democracy, fraternal socialism etc. in which the master subject is strongly en-
trenched. See Carole Pateman The Disorder of Women Polity Cambridge 1989.
5. It is the absence of these reductionist elements from my analysis which seems
to have inspired Birkeland’s inaccurate and totally unsupported assertion that
the concept of the master subject neglects the body and ”splits off the biological
dimension of human psychology and behaviour” from the cerebral. In fact my
account makes a good deal of use of the concept of ”nature within” she claims
I neglect.
6. Thus Birkeland quotes (giving the wrong page reference) a statement of mine
on page 116 that the exclusions of Cartesian ”pure thought” include much more
than the feminine ”not only animality and the body itself, but also material
reality, practical activity, change, the emotions, sympathy, and subjectivity.”
Birkeland objects that these are associated with the feminine. But of course
my sentence does not deny this, and my point, that ”it is not only the feminine
which is excluded” - the body, for example, has class and race as well as gender
association - is not refuted by Birkeland’s claim, but that claim does indicate
her obsession with establishing gender as at the bottom of everything and her
assumption that those who deny the priority of gender ignore gender.
7. bell hooks ”Feminism: a Transformational Politic” in Talking Back 1989
Boston: South End Press, p. 21.
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8. Janis Birkeland ”Ecofeminism” in Greta Gaard ed. Ecofeminism: Women,
Animals and Nature 1993 Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
9. Janis Birkeland 1993, p. 43.
10. For a feminist discussion of the concept of anthrocentrism see Val Plumwood
1996 ”Androcentrism and Anthrocentrism: Parallels and Politics” in Ethics and
the Environment (2) Fall 1996.
11. See for example Val Plumwood 1991 ”Nature, Self and Gender” Hypatia
(6) 1 pp 4-32.
12. Birkeland, 1993. p. 43.
13. On the unclarity of this kind of claim see Elizabeth Spelman The Inessential
Woman 1988 Boston: Beacon Press, p. 117.
14. Janis Birkeland, Environmental Ethics (17) 443-444. In Birkeland 1993
(p. 24), however, it is stated that it is the association with the feminine which
justifies exploitation. Of course, in my framework both can be true, but not in
Birkeland’s.
15. Janis Birkeland 1993.
16. Elizabeth Spelman 1988, p. 117.
17. See Elizabeth Spelman 1988 p ix, bell hooks Ain’t I a Woman 1981 Boston:
South End Press.
18. See Patricia Hill Collins Black Feminist Thought 1990 London: Routledge,
p. 229.
19. Elizabeth Spelman 1988, p. 117.
20. Janis Birkeland 1993, p. 17. Although Birkeland claims that no such
reductionist forms of ecofeminism exist, her own work, as well as the passage
from Charlene Spretnak she quotes, seems to provide a clear example of just
such a position, whose implications have clearly not been faced. The quote
from Spretnak is extracted not from ”a newsletter for lay readers” as Birkeland
claims, but from a definitive ecofeminist collection (Irene Diamond and Gloria
Orenstein eds. Reweaving the World, San Francisco Sierra Club Books 1990,
3-14), which provides a number of other examples.
21. Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva Ecofeminism 1993 Melbourne: Spinifex, p.
160.
22. For capitalist patriarchy to suffice, we would have to make the very prob-
lematic assumption that anti-racist and post-colonial theory could be absorbed
into either the critique of capitalism or that of patriarchy.
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23. See Elizabeth Spelman 1988, p. 122-125.
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